How will AI Change the Law?

June 6, 2025

There has been a lot of speculation about how AI will change the law. Helena Kennedy, Nicolas Mostyn and Charlie Falconer recently interviewed Professor Richard Susskind on the issue in their Law & Disorder Podcast and Nick Abrahams (Norton Rose Fulbright) wrote an article in the Law Society Gazette.

Sample Witness Statement

One of the issues in both those contributions was what would happen to lawyers once a lot of legal work is done by AI. Professor Susskind said doctors do not ask that question. They ask how they can care better for patients using AI. Nick Abrahams points out that technology opens up new markets and there will be complaints and class actions where there were none in the past because it will be so much easier to bring them.

When we talk about AI in the legal context, we are probably thinking about large language models like ChatGPT (there are others that may be able to do specific tasks of course). Professor Hannah Fry points out that they are not encyclopaedias – or brilliant barristers or judges for that matter. She says you need to think about them as actors who are really good at playing a role and who will then use what they have gathered from the internet or other resources to respond in coherent language. So if I send a brief to a brilliant barrister, they will represent my client in court using their own legal knowledge, experience and oratory skills. If I sent my brief to AI, it may well come out with a good opening and closing speech, but it is not a barrister, but an actor who has played a barrister in films and uses those skills to perform (together with an assistant who has gathered legal information from the internet etc.). This may or may not come down to the same outcome. However, who will listen to those speeches – judges or AI?

If we are going to get a multitude of complaints and class actions because AI is making it easier, as Nick Abrahams says, who will decide on all those cases? While it might take a while for courts to use AI judges, no doubt complaints and ombudsman services are quicker to adapt. However, will they produce a fair result?

Let’s look at work, which I think is often underappreciated: drafting written witness statements. In family and civil litigation in England & Wales witness evidence is for the most delivered by way of written statements well in advance of a hearing. When as a solicitor I draft such a witness statement for my client I do not just act as a scribe taking down everything they say. I will advise my client to leave out irrelevant points, probe them on relevant issues, sort the points into a logical order, and use succinct language which a judge can read fast. I may also include words which I feel will speak to judges in general, but I do not know who the judge at the final hearing will be, what mood they are in on the day of the hearing or what my client (and indeed other witnesses) will say when giving evidence.

Often litigants in person do not appreciate how important witness statements are and what can and cannot go into them. They may think everything they may ever want to say should go into a witness statement and include submissions and their opinion (which is not strictly speaking allowed); they may ramble and include a lot of irrelevant points, not only leaving judges frustrated when faced with reading a long statement, but also risking that judges will skim-read them and overlook important points.

If cases were to be decided by AI alone, those drafting statements, written submissions and ultimately even the consumer contracts on which the case may turn, will know the AI judge and will know what key words or points may tip the AI judge’s decision one way or another. This is probably only something someone can do with an equally or more powerful AI which analyses submissions etc and the AI judgements. So if the budget airline uses such AI, it will be at a massive advantage because their contracts, delay and cancellation justifications, complaints handling etc. will be drafted in such a way as to have a high chance to get a favourable outcome from the AI decision maker if the passenger makes a claim. This puts consumers making claims at a disadvantage and we may end up with a two class system where the economically more powerful party can pay for the AI to deal with their claims and massively increase their chances of winning. Unless consumers have access to lawyers or claims handlers who are also using equally powerful AI, their chances of success could be minimal.

We could end up in a system where passengers tick a box on a third-party booking platform which will automatically make a claim in case their flight is delayed, airlines tailor all their written work towards winning a claim and an AI judge decides on the claim – all without humans having anything to do with the process at all. Whether that results in fair outcomes remains to be seen.

Surrogacy in US and Trump II

January 21, 2025
US Passport

President Trump was inaugurated yesterday, 20 January 2025, for his second non-consecutive term and in a sweep of executive orders he also revoked birthright citizenship for future-born children of anyone whose parents do not have settled immigration rights, i.e. are in the US illegally or only as visitors. Does this affect children born to foreign intended parents in US surrogacy?

What does the order say?

The right of people born on US soil to US citizenship is found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the US constitution. Trump’s order seems to hang on the meaning of “subject to the jurisdiction” of the US. Trump tries to exclude two categories of persons:

“(1) when that person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the person’s father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth,” and
“(2) when that person’s mother’s presence in the United States was lawful but temporary, and the person’s father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.”

This would, therefore, mean that children born to parents who are in the US as visitors (as most intended parents are) are excluded from citizenship.

However, the definitions may help IPs because:

“(a) “Mother” means the immediate female biological progenitor.
(b) “Father” means the immediate male biological progenitor.”

This while the surrogate may not be the legal mother due to a pre-birth or post-birth order, she might still be classed as the mother under the order. The definition is not clear because most children born to surrogates have an egg-donor and a surrogate, thus two female progenitors. Could “immediate” refer to the surrogate and exclude the egg-donor? This would in particular be important if the foreign intended mother’s eggs are used in the surrogacy.

Will this order hold up?

The order has been made and is likely to be challenged in the courts. The US Supreme Court seems to have decided the issue as long ago as 1898 in a case called United States v. Wong Kim Ark where a man born in San Francisco to Chinese immigrants was held to be a US Citizen. The court held that “subject to the jurisdiction” excluded only those who were born to foreign rulers or diplomats, born on foreign public ships, or born to enemy forces engaged in hostile occupation of the country’s territory (as well as native tribes, which was later dealt with by legislation).

What should IPs do?

The order takes effect for births 30 days after it was made, so 19 February 2025. Some precautions are probably wise, including:

  • Getting confirmation of the surrogate’s citizenship including a certified copy of her passport or other proof of citizenship;
  • Including in the contract with the surrogate that she confirms her citizenship and will cooperate with any requirements by authorities to prove that so that the IPs can apply for US citizenship for the child;
  • Including a similar clause in the egg-donor agreement in case “immediate female biological progenitor” is given a wider interpretation;
  • Obtaining proof that the surrogate gave birth and is therefore the “immediate female biological progenitor”, such as hospital records;
  • Asking the US passport office local to the place of birth in advance what evidence they may require, e.g. from the surrogate;
  • Get advice from your US attorney and see if the pre- or post-birth order should be re-worded to include that for the purposes of any application for US citizenship the surrogate is declared as the “immediate female biological progenitor”.

More will be known in weeks to come. In the meantime, advice from a specialist US attorney is vital.

Beware of Murky Surrogacy Arrangements

November 20, 2024

A gay couple living in England had engaged “SurrogateBaby” as an agency to have a child through surrogacy. According to the English judge, Mrs Justice Theis, they had at best been naïve about the process. The contract for this international surrogacy was unclear in a lot of areas and they were lucky to have avoided a total disaster. They could have got stuck in a third country with their baby daughter, being bankrupted by neonatal medical bills or worse not been able to have her at all.

While the judgment was almost entirely anonymised, it did name the agency. This agency has a live website and social media presence. It seems to be run by a Russian man and from the judgement the surrogate came from and lived during the surrogacy in a country where “due to the ongoing war” she could not deliver the baby in 2023. This is likely to have been Ukraine or Russia. She then gave birth in a third country and the intended parents were charged extra for this. Surrogacy for same-sex couples is illegal in that country. “SurrogateBaby” is now located in Georgia and this country would fit the description. The fertility treatment took place in the (internationally unrecognised territory of the) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is not part of the EU (contrary to the Southern, Greek part of Cyprus).

The added complication in this particular case was that neither of the intended fathers was a British Citizen. They were both citizens of two different countries where homosexuality was illegal.

They contacted “SurrogateBaby” who told them they were based in “Cyprus”, but it later turned out their head office was elsewhere. The contract provided that the “carrying and childbirth will be carried out in a European Union (EU) country” (northern Cyprus is not an EU country). There is no indication that the country where the surrogate ultimately gave birth in was an EU country. Neither Ukraine nor Russia is in the EU. Even this would not have helped the intended fathers because the laws in the EU about surrogacy vary from full criminalisation (Italy), via situations where there is no criminal sanction for intended parents (Germany) to those where at least altruistic surrogacy is legal in certain circumstances (Netherlands, Denmark). Nor does a birth in the EU make travel to the UK any easier. Health coverage might possibly be under the NHS GHIC scheme in the EU, but it would make no difference to travel.

In the event, the intended fathers were told that the surrogate was to give birth in yet another country where gay couples were not recognised as fathers under surrogacy and so one of them had to pretend he had had a child with his girlfriend. He then had to apply for a passport from his country of origin (where homosexuality is illegal) for his daughter, travel there with her and apply for a UK visa from there for his daughter before being able to come to the UK half a year later. It turned out the surrogate had had no idea she was carrying for a gay couple, but was supportive and agreed to a parental order. The court considered the parental order application, which was granted.

This case shows that intended parents should always conduct due diligence on the proposed surrogacy, especially if it is not clear which countries are involved. In this case there were at least six different jurisdictions:

  1. The first intended father’s home country, where homosexuality is illegal.
  2. The second intended father’s home country, where homosexuality is illegal.
  3. The UK where they applied for a parental order, but where neither was a citizen.
  4. The surrogate’s home country (and the country where the address of the surrogacy agency “SurrogateBaby” was, where surrogacy for gay couples was illegal.
  5. Northern Cyprus, an unrecognised country outside the EU, where the fertility treatment took place.
  6. The country where the surrogate gave birth, where surrogacy for gay couples is illegal.

    The fathers should have made enquiries and obtained legal advice before embarking on this surrogacy journey to find out the legal situation in each of these countries. A lot more than did go wrong could have gone wrong in this case, for example:

    • The surrogate may have given birth in her home country prematurely. Neither the legal situation for the baby’s parentage nor the question of health cover for the baby are clear and the fathers may have had to fund neonatal intensive care out of their own pockets.
    • The baby may have required expensive hospital care in the country she was ultimately born in. Nothing was said or clear about how that would be funded and the fathers could have been stuck with a hefty bill.
    • The home country of the genetic father may not have provided him with a passport for his daughter, in particular if they found out he was gay. This could have meant that the baby would have been stuck in the country of her birth.
    • The father’s home country could have arrested him for his homosexuality while he was there with his daughter and taken her in to care with no other parent in the country.
    • The English court might not have granted the parental order application if they thought the fathers had not acted in good faith. In this case the judge had some doubts, but did make the order in the end. If she had decided otherwise, the second father’s relationship with his daughter would not have been recognised.
    • The surrogate may not have agreed to all or some of these arrangements. We know she was not told that she was carrying for a gay couple. The intended parents had no guarantee she was consenting to any of the arrangement. They had not met her and had no direct contract with her. There could have been criminal charges for trafficking because she was brought across international borders for the fertility treatment and to give birth.

    Overall, this case should be a warning to any intended parents to do their homework. If the offer looks too good to be true, it probably is.

    The case is reported here: Re Z [2024] EWFC 304

    Surrogacy in US and Trump

    November 14, 2024

    Trump has pledged to overturn the right of children born in the US to automatic US citizenship. What does this mean for surrogacy in the US?

    Trump changed the majorities in the US Supreme Court in his first term and when previously it was balanced, there is now a conservative 6:3 majority. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) this led to the overturning of Rowe v Wade, the case which legalised abortion across the US. As a result there is now a hotchpotch of state laws some banning abortion outright and some which might even apply to foetuses in the lab. Intended Parents (IPs) in surrogacy journeys in the US will need to consider the state where their surrogate lives carefully to ensure that she has access to full reproductive rights in case of a miscarriage or other event when continuing the pregnancy is not the preferred option of all involved.

    Before his re-election Trump pledged to overturn the US constitutional right of children born on US soil to US citizenship. This is not expected to be retrospective and could simply be done by presidential decree or a new law which restricts the birthright to children born on US soil where at least one parent is a US citizen or legally resident in the US.

    This would probably also affect international surrogacy journeys in the US because in most states the IPs are the legal parents from birth, whether through a pre-birth or post-birth order. Many IPs currently rely on their child born in the US through surrogacy being able to get a US passport swiftly and travel home with it before taking sometimes a long legal journey to sort out their parental status and therefore the child’s citizenship by descent back home. In the UK this is by way of a parental order.

    While the new law is not expected to apply retroactively, it could come in just before transfer or even while the surrogate is already pregnant and apply to the newborn.

    If you have started your surrogacy journey in the US, this could apply to you. I suggest all foreign IPs should get advice from immigration solicitors back home to ensure they don’t get stuck in the US with neither the US nor their country’s authorities giving the child a passport (at all or soon).

    As far as I understand, UK citizen IPs can get travel documents although parentage is not recognised in family law but the application is sent back to the UK and it can take weeks or months before the child gets British a passport. This could mean the family will have to stay in the US, adding to their overall costs. It would help if the surrogate was unmarried because then at least there is legal parentage through a genetic father (and the surrogate’s spouse is not automatically the second parent). British IPs could also consider any new law carefully and see if it applies to them or if they could apply for a type of visa to the US which would give their child US citizenship automatically (rather than travel on the visa waiver programme) if they are entitled to it.

    While any such law might be unconstitutional, this is ultimately a matter for the courts and the US Supreme Court. Legal arguments do not help IPs who are told by the US Passport Agency that they cannot get a US passport for their newborn. So unless the courts suspend the new law pending a constitutional challenge, this could take years to sort out and meanwhile many new families could spend an unwelcome costly few months in the US waiting for a British (or other) passport.

    Brexit and EU Ancestry Claims

    November 8, 2024

    In a recent case 70 year old Mark Moore applied to the family court for a declaration of parentage to establish that he was the son of the local Irish Catholic priest rather than of his mother’s husband.

    The case was reported because neither of his parents could be part of the proceedings as they had already died long ago. Mr Moore’s motivation seems to have been personal as he wanted to know he was officially part of the Irish family. He was successful in his application. He had Irish ancestry through his mother’s husband and so-far legal father, so he could probably have applied for Irish and therefore EU citizenship that way.

    Yet, it is likely that a number of British Citizens may now want to apply for declarations of parentage in old age to be able to establish EU citizenship, not just for themselves but also for their children and grandchildren. Whether that is based on adulterous priests or German POWs, many British citizens seem to explore all options to see if they can find a way to get a prized EU passport and thus the right to live anywhere in Europe, which was taken away through Brexit.

    Conduct and Domestic Abuse

    August 23, 2024

    One of the factors the court must consider in financial proceedings after divorce or civil partnership dissolution is:

    “the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it;” (s.25(2)(g) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973).

    Often parties feel aggrieved about the behaviour of their spouse at the time of the breakdown of the marriage. Perhaps the relationship has been fraught and toxic for a while. A party may feel that they were trapped in this relationship and could not get out. Others may blame their spouse on the breakdown of the marriage and blame it on the other’s infidelity or accuse them of having walked out on them and the children. It is then tempting to tell the court that the other party’s conduct should be taken into account. However, this can be dangerous and even backfire!

    The statutory definition in s.25 seems circuitous. So, when is conduct such that it would be inequitable to disregard it. There is no clear definition in case law either. Conduct must be “both obvious and gross” (“gross” as in severe rather than disgusting). Well, what does that mean? From decided cases we can see that there are broadly three categories, although any particular behaviour may also fall into more than one category:

    • Marital conduct
    • Financial conduct
    • Litigation conduct

    Examples for marital conduct are where one spouse tried to kill the other, paid third parties to attempt to kill their spouse, the husband had raped and assaulted the wife or ongoing child abduction. There usually needs to be a financial consequence of the conduct for it to make a difference. For example, the mother of the abducted children was given money to pay for legal fees so she could try to get the children back to England.

    Financial conduct cases include those where a spouse syphoned off large amounts of money and hid them, transferred a family business into a company in their own name or deceived the spouse or their family over a long period to pay money to a lover.

    Litigation conduct includes deceiving the court and hiding assets at the time of the financial court proceedings. It could also include running a case which has no hope of success just to achieve that the spouse runs out of money to pay their lawyers and gives up. Thus, in extreme cases pleading a hopeless marital conduct case could amount to litigation conduct. Often the consequence is that the court will make a costs order against that party, which could amount to a substantial sum or even eat up most of what that party ends up with from the division of the assets.

    From this it is also clear that many examples of behaviour will not amount to conduct, including:

    • Having an affair;
    • Spending money on items that are morally wrong unless this is on an extremely large scale;
    • Addiction including alcohol or gambling, unless perhaps someone gambled away the house and the only item left is the pension, which might then go to the other spouse;
    • Being mean, cruel or lying in general.

    The question is how the definition of domestic abuse from the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 makes a difference to this. Under the definition domestic abuse also includes

    • controlling or coercive behaviour,
    • psychological, emotional or other abuse and
    • economic abuse.

    “’Economic abuse’ means any behaviour that has a substantial adverse effect on B’s ability to—
    (a) acquire, use or maintain money or other property, or
    (b) obtain goods or services.”

    My guess is that here the courts will also require a case to be severe. As in physical abuse the examples where conduct was successfully pleaded amount to attempted murder or similar, non-physical abuse will need to be severe, prolonged and have a substantial financial consequence.

    Thus gaslighting the wife, belittling her, making her cut off her family and friends alone may not be conduct. However, I could see a case where that resulted in her giving up her career so that now at the time of her divorce this has severely affected her ability to generate enough income to pay for her financial needs and build up a pension. I could see a court making an order, for example, for ongoing maintenance or a more than 50% pension share where it would not otherwise have done so. A direct financial consequence is not doubt very helpful, although an extreme case of PTSD resulting in an inability to work substantially might also succeed.

    Unless there is a financial detriment which can be shown to result from the abuse, I would be cautious about running a conduct argument in these circumstances because doing so runs the risk of the court making an order for costs against the party who pleaded conduct if it finds against them.

    As with all non-physical abuse there is also an evidential issue: How does one prove the abuse, especially if it is not recent but behaviour over money years?

    Qualified Legal Representatives

    February 26, 2024

    The law recognises that victims of domestic abuse could be retraumatised if they were to be cross-examined by their abusers who are representing themselves. The law now provides for the court to appoint a lawyer to do so instead: a “Qualified Legal Representative” (QLR).

    Royal Courts of Justice in London

    The (alleged) abuser must of course also have a fair hearing, whether in the proceedings about an order preventing them from continuing or repeating the abuse or in financial or children proceedings. To deal with this conundrum, the court will now order for a QLR to conduct the cross-examination of the other party instead in cases where (alleged) abusers are “Litigants in Person”, that means representing themselves. QLRs are paid by the government (although not generously) and are family solicitors or barristers. They are there solely to cross-examine the other party and will not represent the (alleged) abuser otherwise. The court may ask them to provide a written summary of the case for the court hearing, but after they have done their cross-examination they leave and the (alleged) abusers will then continue to represent themselves.

    Cross-examination is still tough or any witness, let alone a victim of domestic abuse, in particular if the case is about the abuse. However, the QLR is specially trained to (cross-)examine vulnerably witnesses and the victim is not asked direct questions from the abuser. That must take some strain out of that otherwise unpleasant experience.

    For the (alleged) abuser, while not getting their own lawyer to represent them, they are being helped by an advocate with what is probably the most difficult task of a final hearing, namely cross-examination. That should also help them to an extend to summarise their case for the court.

    Lesbian Couple’s Children in a Gulf State Subject to English Court

    February 23, 2024

    A recent case (S (Children: Parentage and Jurisdiction) [2023] EWCA Civ 897) shows two interesting points, which are of far wider significance on lesbian paternity and international family law.

    Two women had been civil partners in England and one of them gave birth to (it seems) four children. When the relationship broke down, the gestational mother moved to a Gulf State, they dissolved their civil partnership and both married other women. First the non-birth mother saw the children regularly, but the gestational mother then seems to have stopped that. The oldest child was in boarding school in England.

    Two questions were decided by the Court of Appeal:

    1. Were both women legal parents of the children?
    2. Could the English Court decide on issues child arrangements?

    While the oldest child had been born before a law change, the younger children were born after the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s. 42 came into force, which provides:

    (1) If at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or of her artificial insemination, W was a party to a civil partnership with another woman or a marriage with another woman, then […] the other party to the civil partnership or marriage is to be treated as a parent of the child unless it is shown that she did not consent to the placing in W of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or to her artificial insemination (as the case may be).

    Persian Gulf State - Scene in Dubai as Illustration

    The appeal court decided that consent did not have to be a “deliberate exercise of choice”, but rather the presence or absence of consent may be inferred from the circumstances. Consent does not have to be “in writing or oral or unarticulated” and while “acquiescence …is not the same thing as consent”, “but the court will be careful to distinguish acquiescence from consent that has not been expressly stated.”

    “The big picture here was that these were parties to a civil partnership who wanted children and created a family”; the court had accepted that the non-birth mother wanted children and “The judge’s conclusion that [the non-birth mother] merely acquiesced sits uneasily in the context of a relationship between cohabiting civil partners.”

    This is significant as it gives more certainty to same-sex families and their children. The norm in cohabiting married couples or civil partners must be that if one of the women has a child, the other one is a legal parent of the child.

    The second issue was whether the English Court could decide on the issues about the children. In this case the Gulf State in which (at least) the younger children lived did not recognise same-sex relationships and did not recognise parental rights of non-birth mothers. So they would not decide on any application by the non-birth mother for time with the children. The basic rule is that the courts where the children live have the power to make such decisions. This is also the basis in the 1996 Hague Convention. However, if no country has jurisdiction under those rules, the English court also have the power to make decisions in connection with continuing divorce and civil partnership dissolution proceedings in England. The question was whether this applied in the case where the civil partnership dissolution had been concluded more than 5 years earlier.

    The court followed another recent case (Re T (Children) (Jurisdiction: Matrimonial Proceedings) [2023] EWCA Civ 285) and found that the English courts can continue to decide on child arrangements until they are 18 if the divorce or civil partnership dissolution as in England and Wales. This allows the English courts to look at child arrangements where the divorce or civil partnership dissolution was in England provided the country where the children live (broadly) is not a member of the 1996 Hague Convention. In cases where this could happen, that may be a good reason to have the divorce in England rather than elsewhere.

    The practical effect for this non-birth mother is not entirely clear from the report. I suppose with the oldest son in boarding school in England the birth mother continues to travel to England and does not want to fall foul of a court order so will comply with an order made in England.

    Lesbians are Divorcing more than Gay Men

    February 19, 2024
    Gay & Lesbian Divorce Rates

    Women who get married to other women divorce at almost twice the rate gay men do. Overall, 14.4% of same-sex marriages and civil partnerships in England and Wales have ended in divorce. For men the rate is 11%, for women 18%.

    For same-sex marriage, which has only been around since 2014, the rates are even starker: 5% of male but 10% of female same-sex marriages have ended in divorce. For civil partnership the rates are 16% and 29% respectively. More male than female couples entered into civil partnerships until the end of 2020 (37,990 and 30,933), although more women got married (18,180 male and 23,578 female couples). It is striking therefore that so many more female couples have already ended their marriage or civil partnership than male couples.

    This is not a sudden spike. Even looking at the figures until 2015 (for the first 10 years of formalisation of same-sex relationships) or just at the figures until the end of 2013 before equal marriage was possible, for each male couple formally ending their relationship there were between 1.63 and 1.76 female couples doing so. The government has published a statistic showing the civil partnership dissolutions each year in relation to 1,000 civil partner couples and there are similar differences in the male/female ratios.

    This cannot be a coincidence as the figures show the same trend over the years. There must be a reason in the way and culture gay couples arrange their relationships and lesbian couples do. Are gay couples more open to an open relationship so that sexual relations outside the relationship are allowed and are not a reason to end it? Does this tell us something about women’s attitude to relationships altogether? It would be amazing for academics to research this in detail.

    Unfortunately, the statistics do not allow us to compare same-sex with opposite-sex relationships because same-sex civil partnership and now marriage has only been around for a short period of time. We cannot assume that all same-sex couples have been together for decades when they formalised their relationship, nor can we assume that they have not. With marriages there is also the issue that people may have married abroad and divorce here, certainly for countries from where there is immigration into the UK. The main ones are in Eastern Europe and India and China. For same-sex couples there is likely to be less of a one-way movement because the main countries of immigration do not have same-sex marriage or registered partnership.

    It is also interesting to see that after an initial backlog of civil partnership formations in 2006 (14,943) the figures dropped to around 6,000 a year until equal marriage came in at the end of 2014 and are now around 1,000 a year or less. At the same time there are around 7,000 same-sex weddings a year in England and Wales. Obviously, the figures dropped during the pandemic when people could not get married during lockdown. This shows that civil partnership was not what lesbians and gay men really wanted, but just a token “marriage light” the government offered as a consolation price to the LGBT+ community in 2004. Since 2019 opposite-sex couples can register civil partnerships and although the numbers are low compared to marriages, they far outnumber same-sex couples (for 2021 5,692 to 1,039).

    The marriage and civil partnership figures are taken to the end of 2020 and the divorce and civil partnership dissolution figures to the end of 2021. This is because one cannot divorce or dissolve a civil partnership in the first year. This ignores a small number of nullity decrees (13 overall).

    The figures come from the marriage, civil partnership, divorce and civil partnership dissolution statistics freely available on the Office for National Statistics website. They ignore relationships which have ended by one partner dying, which have been dissolved elsewhere in the UK or abroad and couples who got married or partnered elsewhere and divorced or dissolved their civil partnership in England and Wales. We also do not yet have the number of conversions of civil partnerships to marriages for 2021, although this will be marginal because there were only 238 overall in 2020 (146 male and 92 female couples).

    AI is no use for legal research

    February 16, 2024

    I tried out AI to do legal research and here is the result.

    I was looking at child maintenance the other day and the way the Child Maintenance Service (CMS) calculates child maintenance in specific cases. That is set out in Schedule 1 to the Child Support Act 1991. So far so good.

    This has been amended several times and the government helpfully has the amended latest version on its legislation website. However, there is a paragraph that provides that some people do not have to pay child maintenance at all:

    5 The rate payable is nil if the non-resident parent—
    (a) is of a prescribed description; or
    (b) has a gross weekly income of below £7.

    How do I find out what “prescribed description” means? This is set out in secondary legislation, also called statutory instruments or SIs. They are also online on the government legislation website, but they are not cross-referenced in the act which they define further, nor are they updated. So an SI may have been amended by another SI, but the older SI will appear on the government website in its original wording. So unless I get a learned book on the topic (and even then finding this is not straightforward), I would have to traipse through dozens of SIs to find the definition. I did find the answer (by chance) in regulation 45 of the Child Support Maintenance Calculation Regulations 2012 SI 2012 No. 2677: prisoners, children and some students and residents in care homes etc.

    I wondered whether AI could get there quicker. Since all this information is publicly online and it is just a question of reading all of it, cross-referencing it and finding the most recent version if there is more than one, it does not really take intelligence to find it, just the ability to read a lot of information fast and put it in date order.

    I started with bing.com AI. I asked:

    Hi. I’m looking for the statutory instrument which sets out the “prescribed purposes” for paragraph 5 of schedule 1 of the child support act 1991.

    It told me:

    I’m sorry, but I couldn’t find the specific statutory instrument that sets out the “prescribed purposes” for paragraph 5 of schedule 1 of the Child Support Act 1991. The information available on the legislation’s website1 does not provide the exact details you’re looking for. You may want to consult a legal expert or a law library for more specific information.

    Elon Musk 
U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY, Colo. --  Tesla Inc. Chief Executive Officer Elon Musk speaks with Lt. Gen. Richard Clark, Superintendent of the U.S. Air Force Academy, during the Ira C. Eaker Distinguished Speaker Presentation in the Academy's Arnold Hall on April 7, 2022 in Colorado Springs, Colo. (U.S. Air Force photo by Trevor Cokley)

    Polite but wrong. I tried Gemini from Google next:

    Unfortunately, there isn’t a single statutory instrument that directly defines the “prescribed purposes” for paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 of the Child Support Act 1991. Here’s why:

      1. No specific instrument: Paragraph 5 itself doesn’t mention any specific statutory instrument for prescribed purposes. Instead, it references regulations made by the Secretary of State. This means the definition of “prescribed purposes” depends on the specific regulations in force at the time.
      2. Dynamic regulations: Child support regulations are regularly updated and amended. Past regulations might not be valid now, making it difficult to pinpoint a single instrument.
      3. Multiple regulations: Several different sets of regulations could contain relevant definitions depending on the specific scenario you’re interested in.

    Right, yes, if the SI was mentioned in the Act, I would not have asked! So I thought: “Third time lucky.” and tried ChatGPT (free version):

    The statutory instrument you’re referring to is likely “The Child Support (Information, Evidence and Disclosure) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/1812)” which sets out the prescribed purposes for paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 of the Child Support Act 1991.

    And which paragraph in that SI do I need to look at?

    You’ll want to look at paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 of “The Child Support (Information, Evidence and Disclosure) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/1812)” for the prescribed purposes related to paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 of the Child Support Act 1991.

    Not only did ChatGPT randomly pluck out an SI (admittedly relating to child support), but it also referred to a paragraph of a Schedule which didn’t even exist. It simply made it up.

    So when Elon Musk said that we would all be out of a job in a few years’ time because AI can do it, I am not getting concerned. (Despite having 10 surviving children, Musk also doesn’t seem to have cared for a child, older person or anyone else in his life or he would know that AI is hardly going to be able to do that job.)