Lesbian Couple's Children in a Gulf State Subject to English Court

A recent case (S (Children: Parentage and Jurisdiction) [2023] EWCA Civ 897) shows two interesting points, which are of far wider significance on lesbian paternity and international family law.

Two women had been civil partners in England and one of them gave birth to (it seems) four children. When the relationship broke down, the gestational mother moved to a Gulf State, they dissolved their civil partnership and both married other women. First the non-birth mother saw the children regularly, but the gestational mother then seems to have stopped that. The oldest child was in boarding school in England.

Two questions were decided by the Court of Appeal:

  1. Were both women legal parents of the children?
  2. Could the English Court decide on issues child arrangements?

While the oldest child had been born before a law change, the younger children were born after the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s. 42 came into force, which provides:

(1) If at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or of her artificial insemination, W was a party to a civil partnership with another woman or a marriage with another woman, then […] the other party to the civil partnership or marriage is to be treated as a parent of the child unless it is shown that she did not consent to the placing in W of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or to her artificial insemination (as the case may be).

Persian Gulf State - Scene in Dubai as Illustration

The appeal court decided that consent did not have to be a “deliberate exercise of choice”, but rather the presence or absence of consent may be inferred from the circumstances. Consent does not have to be “in writing or oral or unarticulated” and while “acquiescence …is not the same thing as consent”, “but the court will be careful to distinguish acquiescence from consent that has not been expressly stated.”

“The big picture here was that these were parties to a civil partnership who wanted children and created a family”; the court had accepted that the non-birth mother wanted children and “The judge’s conclusion that [the non-birth mother] merely acquiesced sits uneasily in the context of a relationship between cohabiting civil partners.”

This is significant as it gives more certainty to same-sex families and their children. The norm in cohabiting married couples or civil partners must be that if one of the women has a child, the other one is a legal parent of the child.

The second issue was whether the English Court could decide on the issues about the children. In this case the Gulf State in which (at least) the younger children lived did not recognise same-sex relationships and did not recognise parental rights of non-birth mothers. So they would not decide on any application by the non-birth mother for time with the children. The basic rule is that the courts where the children live have the power to make such decisions. This is also the basis in the 1996 Hague Convention. However, if no country has jurisdiction under those rules, the English court also have the power to make decisions in connection with continuing divorce and civil partnership dissolution proceedings in England. The question was whether this applied in the case where the civil partnership dissolution had been concluded more than 5 years earlier.

The court followed another recent case (Re T (Children) (Jurisdiction: Matrimonial Proceedings) [2023] EWCA Civ 285) and found that the English courts can continue to decide on child arrangements until they are 18 if the divorce or civil partnership dissolution as in England and Wales. This allows the English courts to look at child arrangements where the divorce or civil partnership dissolution was in England provided the country where the children live (broadly) is not a member of the 1996 Hague Convention. In cases where this could happen, that may be a good reason to have the divorce in England rather than elsewhere.

The practical effect for this non-birth mother is not entirely clear from the report. I suppose with the oldest son in boarding school in England the birth mother continues to travel to England and does not want to fall foul of a court order so will comply with an order made in England.